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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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In the Department of Defense (DoD), the typical outcome of a software acquisition 
program has been massive cost escalation, slipping planned delivery dates and making major 
cuts in the planned software functionality to guarantee program success. To counter this 
dilemma, the DoD put forth a new weapons acquisition policy in 2003 based on an evolutionary 
acquisition approach to foster increased efficiency while building flexibility in the acquisition 
process. However, the evolutionary acquisition approach often relies on the spiral development 
process, which assumes end-state requirements are known at the inception of the development 
process, a misrepresentation of reality in the acquisition of DoD software-intensive weapons 
                                                
1 This work was supported in part by the NPS Acquisition Research Program—OUSD_08 (Project #:F08-
023, JON: RGB58). The views and conclusions in this talk are those of the authors and should not be 
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, 
of the US Government. 
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systems. This article presents a framework to address requirements uncertainty as it relates to 
software acquisition. The framework is based on Real Options theory and aims at mitigating 
risks associated with requirement volatility based on the technology objectives—constraints as 
put forth by the customer at the acquisition decision-making level.  
1. Introduction 
The software acquisition lifecycle, which encapsulates the activities related to its 
procurement, development, implementation and subsequent maintenance, continues to present 
challenges to software executives and program managers due to increasingly complex 
organizational requirements and the ever-increasing role that software plays in US Department 
of Defense (DoD) weapons systems. Various factors and considerations, most of which are 
complex in nature, compound the software acquisition process: factors that present themselves 
in the form of “uncertainties,” and which have the potential of introducing risks if the 
uncertainties are not adequately addressed and or resolved. In this paper, we address the issue 
of requirements uncertainty and propose a methodology for addressing this issue.  Our 
approach addresses these issues by taking a proactive/preemptive approach to risk 
management by planning and paying up front for the risks associated with requirements. This is 
not to say that risk management strategies are not being adopted today; rather, there is a failure 
of management to take a strategic approach towards risk management. Currently, the status 
quo is to employ reactive risk management strategies that often result in the reduction of much-
needed functionality from the scope of the software investment effort. We therefore propose a 
more proactive decision-making framework that involves identifying the risks, pricing risk upfront 
during the planning stages of the acquisition before a decision to commit resources is made.  
2. The Requirements Dilemma 
In software development, requirements instability has a profound impact on a program’s 
schedule and drives up costs due to increases in Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 
(RDT&E) costs associated with the requirements changes. The lack of adequately defined 
requirements is one of the leading problems in the software development effort. Without 
adequate definition and validation of requirements and design, software engineers could be 
coding to an incorrect solution, resulting in missing functionality and errors. This dilemma is 
highlighted in a 2007 interview of the Army’s Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Ammunition, 
in which “the ability to acquire and maintain, safe, reliable supportable and modifiable software 
systems which met user requirements in an environment of rapid technological advances” was 
identified as their biggest challenge in software acquisitions (Starrett, 2007). Furthermore, the 
US Government Accountability Office (GAO), responsible for reviewing weapon systems 
investments, found consistent problems of cost increases, schedule delays, and performance 
shortfalls exacerbated by factors such as pressure on program managers to promise more than 
they could deliver. These concerns infer a resounding theme that continues to resonate within 
the software acquisition community: Meeting customer requirements within cost and schedule 
constraints. 
Balancing the satisfaction of a customer’s ever-changing requirements within the realms 
of meeting both current and future uncertain operational needs against the costs and schedule 
constraints poses a cumbersome challenge to the software executive, thereby making software-
investments a very risky venture. They are risky in the sense that software engineering and 
investment decisions are plagued by uncertainties that more often than not lead to varying 
degrees of risk ranging from operational shortfalls to cost and schedule overruns.  
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Ever-changing requirements continue to impact software acquisition efforts, and more 
often than not, force managers to choose between requirements, i.e., which requirements to 
accept and which requirements to reject with the full understanding that ignoring changes in 
requirements results in the delivered product failing to meet the customers needs while 
accepting changes in requirements has the potential of impacting costs and schedule.  
Furthermore, changes in requirements while a software acquisition effort is under way 
poses the risk of introducing unwanted, unanticipated or unknown impact on existing 
requirements, not to mention associated costs and scheduled delays depending on the phase of 
the investment or software development process experiencing significant requirements 
changes. While the standard practice has been to “freeze” requirements prior to the 
commencement of any development activities, frequently, this does not work and is not 
representational of the DoD doctrine to support the flexible development and rapid delivery of 
products to meet the warfighters needs in an ever-changing environment in response to 
operational needs.  
The inefficiencies of current management techniques as shown in Table 1 highlight the 
needs of new management approaches that proactively plan for and factor uncertainty into their 
acquisition strategy. This is because the acquisition of software, its development and the 
operational use of the software are dominated by human action, human judgment, decision-
making and, inevitably, human error. The outcome is, therefore, often uncertain and 
unpredictable and leads to unavoidable uncertainties that introduce and drive risk (Starrett, 
2007). 








We must, however, emphasize that uncertainty should not be confused with risk as there 
is an important distinction between the two. Risk is something one bears and is the outcome of 
uncertainty, as uncertainty is either resolved through the passage of action or left unattended 
due to inaction (Mun, 2006). The risks associated with the acquisition of the software need to be 
identified and analyzed very early in the decision-making process, and an approach to mitigate 
the high-priority risks must be incorporated into a software acquisition plan. 
Therefore, in order to accurately estimate requirements volatility and its impact on the 
future value of a software-intensive-system under consideration for acquisition, the risk of 
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requirements changes must be quantified, and it must also be specifically predicted and 
quantified based on the phase in the software development process in which the changes are 
more likely to occur. Hence, the need arises for an approach that would explicitly acknowledge 
the probability of occurrence based on previous objective estimates also in addition to the 
possibility of occurrence based on subject expert opinions (Delphi Method) that acknowledges 
either the degree of belief or ignorance in the objective probability estimates. (See Section 4 for 
details.) 
3. The Real Options Approach 
The Real Options approach is based on the concepts of financial options theory, and it 
builds on several tried-and-proven approaches of management. The study conducted by 
Olagbemiro (2008), showed how the Real Options approach could be used as a proactive risk 
management tool within a strategic decision-making level (executive level) pre-acquisition 
context—further complementing the spiral development approach at the “tactical level.” It was 
also demonstrated using the US Army Future Combat Systems program as an example of how 
the traditional Real Options methodology, when enhanced and properly formulated around a 
proposed or existing software-investment, could provide a framework for guiding software 
acquisition decision-making by highlighting the strategic importance of managerial flexibility. 
This flexibility offers management the ability to balance the satisfaction of a customer’s 
requirements within the realms of the associated cost and schedule constraints by developing 
the appropriate options during the acquisition decision-making phase and executing the options 
when optimal. However, the Real Options approach calls for the existence or satisfaction of 
certain pre-conditions before it can be applied. These pre-conditions, which correlate directly to 
the various activities associated with software related capital investments, are outlined in Mun 
(2006) as follows:  
1. The existence of a basic financial model used to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
the underlying software asset (e.g., Net Present Value (NPV) as the Real Options 
approach builds on the existing tried-and-tested approaches of current financial 
modeling techniques.  
 
2. The existence of uncertainties during the software-related capital investment 
decision-making process, otherwise the Real Options analysis becomes useless as 
everything is assumed to be certain and known. 
 
3. The uncertainties surrounding the software-related capital investment decision-
making process must introduce risks that directly impact the decision-making 
process. Real Options could then be used to hedge the downside risk and take 
advantage of the upside uncertainties. 
 
4. Management must have the flexibility or option to make mid-course corrections when 
actively managing the project. 
 
5. Management must be smart enough to execute the Real Options when it becomes 
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3.1 Real Options Valuation  
Real options valuation originated from research performed to price financial option 
contracts in the field of financial derivatives. The underlying premise of its suitability and 
applicability to software engineering is based on the recognition that strategic flexibility in 
software acquisitions decisions can be valued as a portfolio of options or choices in real 
“assets,” akin to options on financial securities that have real economic value under uncertainty 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1995). In contrast to financial options, real options valuation centers on real or 
non-financial assets and is valuable because it enables the option holder (i.e., software program 
manager) to take advantage of potential upside benefits while controlling and hedging risks. 
When extended to a real “asset,” such as software, real options could be used as a decision-
making tool in a dynamic and uncertain environment. An option gives its holder the rights but 
without the obligations, to acquire or dispose of a risky asset at a set price within a specified 
time period (Erdogmus, 1999). If the market conditions are favorable before the option expires, 
the holder exercises this right, thus making a profit—otherwise, the holder lets the option expire. 
A necessary and key tenet of the real options approach is a requirement for the 
presence of uncertainties, a constraint that is widely characteristic of software acquisitions 
decision-making. Software acquisitions encapsulate the activities related to software 
procurement, development, implementation, and subsequent maintenance. The uncertainties 
that surround these activities are compounded by increasingly complex requirements demanded 
by the warfighter and present themselves in various forms: changing or incomplete 
requirements, insufficient knowledge of the problem domain, decisions related to the future 
growth, technology maturation, and evolution of the software.  
To tackle the issue, we developed a formal and distinct uncertainty elicitation task as 
part of the software investment decision-making process (Figure 1) to obtain information on the 
relevant uncertainties from a strategic point of view. While this task would not include members 
of a typical requirements team, they would work in tandem with the requirements team to 
identify and document uncertainties as they are revealed from an independent point of view. 
Implementing an explicit uncertainty elicitation task would facilitate the identification of 
uncertainties very early in the acquisition process, so that the necessary steps could be taken to 
either refine the requirements to address the uncertainties or identify strategic options to 
mitigate the risks posed by the uncertainties.  
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Figure 1. Uncertainty Elicitation Model 
 
In the uncertainty elicitation step in the model, uncertainties are captured from two 
perspectives (the managerial and technical perspective) using what we call the “2 T” approach 
as illustrated in Figure 2. Managerial uncertainties of people, time, functionality, budget, and 
resources contribute to both estimation and schedule uncertainties that are considered to be 
pragmatic uncertainties. Technical uncertainties of incomplete requirements, ambitious, 
ambiguous, changing or unstable requirements contribute to software specification 
uncertainties. Such uncertainties lead to software design and implementation, software 
validation and software evolution uncertainties all of which can be categorized as exhibiting both 
Heisenberg-type and Gödel-like uncertainties. 
If uncertainty cannot be resolved, strategic real options could be developed to address 
the risks posed by the uncertainty, providing management the flexibility to address the risks 








Figure 2. Expanded View of Uncertainty Elicitation Model 
 
3.2 The Real Options Framework 
To develop the appropriate options to hedge against the risks due to the uncertainties 
surrounding a software acquisition effort, we develop a generalized Real Options Framework 
(Figure 3) in line with the five preconditions outlined in Mun (2006). This proposed framework 
consists of the following four phases, each of which explicitly addresses and establishes 
compliance with the preconditions.  
1. Study Phase 
2. Data Collection and Preparation Phase 
3. Analysis Phase 








Figure 3. Real Options Framework 
 
4. Addressing Uncertainty 
Uncertainties permeate virtually every phase of the software acquisition process—
ranging from procurement decision-making, requirements specification, software development 
and implementation, to the eventual evolution of the software. These uncertainties could be 
broadly categorized into the categories shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Taxonomy of Uncertainty 
 
Epistemic uncertainties are reducible, and they deal with our lack of knowledge, 
lack of information and our own and others’ subjectivity concerning an issue. Aleatoric 
uncertainties, on the other hand, are irreducible and they deal with the randomness (or 
predictability) of an event due to variability of input or model parameters when the 
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characterization of the variability is available (Wojtkiewicz, Eldred, Field, Urbina, & Red-
Horse, 2001). In other words, an aleatoric uncertainty is an inherent variation associated 
with the physical system or the environment. Both epistemic and aleotoric uncertainties 
are interwoven and form the general framework of uncertainties that plague software 
acquisition efforts from a requirements uncertainty perspective.  
Since requirements uncertainty implies risk, consequently, uncertainty must be duly 
quantified as a risk factor to gauge the magnitude of its impact on the underlying asset. The 
process of translating or equating software engineering uncertainties into a quantifiable property 
begins with quantifying the identified requirements uncertainties, computing the impact of 
uncertainties and ultimately developing a risk analysis framework in which the associated risks 
are identified, predicted and modeled using simulation and the results analyzed and costs 
factored into the software acquisition as appropriate. 
4.1 Estimating Requirements Volatility 
While volatility is just one of the parameters needed for Real Options analysis, it is the 
most difficult of all the parameters to estimate. Given the impact that requirements instability has 
on costs, we attempt to determine the rate of requirement change or the volatility of 
requirements. We will then use volatility to quantify the risk of requirements changes in the 
proposed software acquisition effort. 
In order to estimate the volatility of the returns associated with our current software 
investment effort, we attempt to gather evidence to help derive our estimates.  Historically, 
gathering of evidence using previously completed software-related capital investments as a 
proxy is a difficult task for the following reasons: 
1. The current software investment effort under consideration might be the first of its 
kind with no known comparables. 
2. Information is rarely or actively collected and managed in a disciplined fashion. 
3. Even when information is collected, accessibility by third parties is usually difficult 
due to the proprietary nature of the information.  
Thus, more often than not, the software executive is faced with identifying alternate 
sources of information to either assert or dispute their initial volatility estimates. In our study, we 
propose to use either historical data (i.e., objective approach) or expert opinions obtained using 
the Delphi method (i.e., subjective approach). We choose to use both methods because we 
believe intuition and judgment (subjective approach) should supplement quantitative analysis 
(objective approach). More often than not, past success and failures serve as key indicators of 
the future. Historical data can be used to predict and explore “what-if” scenarios on future 
projects based on the use of forecasting and analytical analysis. 
The Delphi Method is a technique first introduced by the RAND Corporation in the 
1940’s as a methodology for the elicitation of the opinion of an expert or groups of experts to 
guide decision-making by the making predictions about future events. It places emphasis on an 
iterative, systematic, disciplined and interactive process of individual interviews (usually 
conducted using questionnaires) and the outcome is based on the Hegelian Principle of 
achieving consensus through a three-step process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis (Stuter, 
1996). In the thesis and antithesis steps, the team of experts present their opinion or views on 
the given subject, establishing views and opposing views, and consensus is ultimately reached 
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during the synthesis phase as opposing views are brought together to form the new thesis. 
Widely used as an estimating tool, the Delphi Method has been used to estimate values for 
factors (e.g., cost estimation) that appear in software estimation models such (Boehm, Abts, & 
Chulani, 2000) and risk estimation. Furthermore, it is one of the approved techniques published 
in February 2001 by the US Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center for preparing or 
reviewing economic analyses in support of the decision-making process. 
In the event that there is no historical data available, the customer should resort to 
obtaining the required information using the Delphi Method. In the case that we do have 
historical data but are unable to find projects meeting any or all of the criteria above, we 
proceed to “fit” the data to as close as possible to mimic our current software investment effort 
by employing interpolation techniques to understand and forecast our project based on the 
trends depicted in the historical data.  
To determine the rate of volatility, we employ the Caper Jones’ approach, which is a 
transposition from the financial industry (Kulk & Verhoef, 2008). Jones asserts that existing 
methods of average percentage of change of the overall requirements volume lacks information 
because it does not give any information on the time in which the change occurred—a key 
factor in determining software engineering since requirements changes become more 
expensive to implement the farther we are into the software development process.  
Jones therefore uses the compound monthly requirements volatility rate to express the 
time aspect. Calculating monthly requirements volatility rates, as defined by Jones, is a 
transposition from the financial world. The time value or future value of money is well-known in 
the field of accounting as compound interest or CAGR, short for compound annual growth rate. 
By transposing from compound growth rate in finance, we assume that requirements are 







SizeAtEndr        (1) 






SLOCAtEndr        (2) 
where t is the time period in years during which the estimates were observed. 
However, SLOC is not a suitable proxy for measuring requirements volatility because it 
is often dependent on the type of programming language being used and does not take COTS 
into consideration. In light of this finding, we proposed an alternative proxy: Function Points, 
which is a better metric for the size of the software requirements irrespective of how the 
software will be developed.  
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4.2 Refining Volatility Estimates 
Volatility refinement based on the Dempster-Shafer Theory on Evidence was a key 
aspect of the framework proposed in Olagbemiro (2008). Since volatility is a key input 
parameter needed for Real Options analysis, we attempt to overcome the complexity of volatility 
estimation by proposing the use of Dempster-Shafer Theory on Evidence, a technique first 
proposed for application in the domain of sensor fusion. It is a mathematical theory of evidence 
based on belief functions and plausible reasoning, which is used to combine separate pieces of 
information (evidence) to calculate the probability of an event. We posit that it could be used to 
address both aleotoric and epistemic uncertainties inherent in software-related capital 
investments by “fusing” and reducing uncertainties to the maximum extent as they become 
revealed, thereby facilitating a more accurate estimate of the risks propagated by uncertainty 
and allowing us to develop the appropriate option in response based on a more accurate 
volatility measure. 
We choose to use DST because while Bayesian inference requires all unknowns to be 
represented by probability distributions, which awkwardly implies the probability of an event for 
which we are completely ignorant, DST takes over by introducing belief functions to distinguish 
ignorance and randomness by assigning probability mass to subsets of parameter space, so 
that randomness is represented by the probability distribution and uncertainty is represented by 
large subsets (Gelman, 2006). In other words, while Bayesian theory requires probabilities for 
each uncertainty of interest, the theory of belief functions provides a non-Bayesian way of using 
mathematical probability to quantify subjective judgments (Shafer, 1996). It measures degrees 
of belief (or confidence) for one uncertainty on the probabilities for a related uncertainty. 
The premise behind DST is it can be interpreted as a generalization of probability theory 
where probabilities are assigned to sets as opposed to mutually exclusive singletons. In the 
case that there is sufficient evidence to permit the assignment of probabilities to single events, 
the Dempster-Shafer model collapses to the traditional probabilistic formulation in which 
evidence is associated with only one possible event (Sentz & Ferson, 2002). DST relies on 
three basic functions: the basic probability assignment function, a primitive of evidence theory 
that does not refer to probability in the classical sense, and two non-additive continuous 
measures called Belief and Plausibility that are used to combine separate pieces of information 
(evidence) to calculate the probability of an event, while simultaneously defining the upper and 
lower bounds, respectively, of an interval that contains the precise probability of a set of interest. 
Since evidence can be associated with multiple possible events (i.e., sets of events) the 
evidence in DST can be meaningful at a higher level of abstraction—a key benefit needed at the 
strategic decision-making level that eliminates resorting to assumptions about the events within 
the evidential set. Furthermore, the DST model can be used to cope with varying levels of 
precision regarding information with no further assumptions needed to represent the 
information, as demonstrated during a study in addressing uncertainties in systems (Sentz & 
Ferson, 2002).  We posit that the demonstrated approach also allows for the direct 
representation of uncertainties associated with software-related capital investments since we 
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DST is a theory about two things: 1) Degrees of belief and 2) Weights of evidence.  A 
key benefit of DST is the ability to represent ignorance in the face of uncertainty, especially 
when there is no information so far. In probability theory, uniform distributions are used to 
represent ignorance; however, the problem with this approach is that we represent the space of 
possibilities affected by the probabilities we get. The theory of belief functions is based on two 
ideas:  
1.  The idea of obtaining degrees of belief for one question from subjective probabilities 
of a related question, and 
2. Dumpster’s rule for combining such degrees of belief when they are based on 
independent items of evidence. Degrees of belief obtained in this way differ from 
probabilities in that they may fail to add to 100%.   
Both ideas are consistent with the Real Options pre-conditions as the degrees of 
belief are established on a frame of discernment meant to address uncertainty.  DST 
assumes a Universe of Discourse Θ, otherwise known as the Frame of Discernment, 
which is a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. Thus a frame of discernment A of a set of 
mutually exclusive alternatives or possibilities can be represented as  
Θ = {A1………..An}          (4) 
where A1 through An represents the set of possibilities or mutually exclusive alternatives.  
A key stipulation of DST is that it should only be used to combine belief functions that 
represent independent items of evidence. The independence required is simply probabilistic 
independence applied to the questions for which we have probabilities, rather than directly to 
the question of interest. In other words, it means that the sources of information (or at least their 
current properties as sources of information) are selected independently from well-defined 
populations. 
Combining information or evidence from multiple sources (historical data and Delphi 
method) in the form of belief assignments aggregates the information with respect to its 








when A ≠  Ø       (5) 
where  K = ∑
=∩ ØCB
)C(2)B(1 mm  
This rule is computed by summing the products of the belief probability 
assignments (bpa’s) of all sets where the intersection is null, and represents basic 
probability mass associated with conflict. In addition, m12(A) is calculated from the 
aggregation of two bpa’s m1 and m2.  
Assuming we have two pieces of evidence, based on historical data and expert 
judgment (Delphi Method), we combine the pieces of evidence using the Dempster’s 
combination rules by computing the orthogonal sum of both. First, we determine the pairs of 
sets whose intersection is A for a given set A such that A1 I A2 = A. We then add the products 
of the basic probability assignments m1(A1) and m2(A2), giving us  
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The orthogonal sum of m1 and m2 defined by m = m1 ⊕ m2 could then be given as m(Ø) 
= 0 and is demonstrated in the matrix below (Table 2), in which we compute the orthogonal sum 
of three hypothetical risk factors (Risk1, Risk2 and Risk) affecting a software investment 
program based on two independent expert assessments. 
 
 
Table 2. Orthogonal Sum of Basic Probability Assignments 
 
Based on the sample matrix (Table 2), we can obtain the resulting three evidence 
functions. 
m1 ⊕ m2({Risk1})  
=  m1({Risk1})*m2({Risk1)} + m1({Risk1,Risk2})*m2({Risk1}) 
 + m1({Risk1,Risk2,Risk3})*m2({Risk1}) + m1({Risk1})*m2({Risk1, Risk2}) + 
m1({Risk1})*m2({Risk1, Risk2, Risk3}) 
m1 ⊕ m2({Risk1,Risk2})  
=  m1({Risk1,Risk2})*m2({Risk1,Risk2})  
+ m1({Risk1, Risk2})*m2({Risk1, Risk2, Risk3})  
+ m1({Risk1, Risk2, Risk 3})*m2({Risk1, Risk2}) 
m1 ⊕ m2({Risk1,Risk2,Risk3})  
=  m1({Risk1,Risk2,Risk3})*m2({Risk1,Risk2,Risk3}) 
Using on the information derived from the matrix, we can establish joint beliefs. Any 
variations between inferred probability assignments based on the mass of evidence under this 
joint belief and our initial volatility estimates based on our modified Caper Jones’ equation (Eqn. 
3) would reflect inconsistencies. These variations are captured and used to refine the initial 
probability estimates to reflect the new “findings” that are then modeled using a Monte Carlo 
simulation to derive new estimates for the requirements volatility and an overall volatility for the 
software acquisition effort.  
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5. Applying the Real Options Valuation Framework 
In an attempt to validate our proposed approach, we applied the framework to the 
software component FCSN (Future Combat Systems Network) of US Army Future Combat 
System (FCS). The decision to select this case study as a validation mechanism was based on 
the recent nature of the project, the high-risks associated with software development due to the 
advanced technologies involved, the challenge of networking the FCS subsystems so that FCS-
equipped units can function as intended, and the associated outcome had a Real Options 
approach been applied.  This section summarizes our study. Readers can refer to Olagbemiro 
(2008) for the details of the study. 
5.1 Development of a Business Case 
We used a traditional discounted cash flow model to obtain a net present value (NPV) in 
terms of five high-level determinants (Erdogmus & Vandergraaf, 1999): 







−∑ - I 
where I is the (initial) development cost of the FCSN 
t is the (initial) development time or time to deploy the FCSN. 
C is the asset value of the FCSN over time t 
M is the operation cost of the FCSN over time t 
r is the rate at which all future cash flows are to be discounted (the discount rate). 
 
A NPV of $6.4 trillion3 was computed for the FCSN using estimated values based on key 
assumptions in Olagbemiro (2008). 
5.2 Identification of Uncertainties and Risk Quantification 
Using publicly available information (GAO, 2008), we determined that requirements 
uncertainty fostered by technology maturation issues plagued the FCSN program and resulted 
in the following uncertainties: 
1. Requirements uncertainties 
2. Integration uncertainties 
3. Performance uncertainties 
4. Estimation uncertainties (size and cost of the software) 
5. Scheduling uncertainties. 
In response, we developed Real Options to mitigate the risk due to requirements 
change. Due to the lack of publicly available historical data for the FCSN program, data from the 
Joint Strike Fighter program was fitted and utilized as a source of historical information for 
comparative purposes. The risk of requirements changes in the FCSN program was estimated 
                                                
3 NPV of $6.4 trillion is computed based on (1) Value of the FCSN program, (future value less operating 
costs, i.e., sum of (C – M), = $10 trillion), (2) Initial development cost I = $163.7 billion, (3) r = 3%, and (4) 
Time t to develop the FCSN = 13 years. 
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to be 12% (as oppose to 0.28% for the JSF program, which is 1/5 the size of the FCSN 
program) using Equation 1.4  
We used requirements volatility to quantify the risk effect as variations in the returns 
associated with the investment.  We ran Monte Carlo simulation of the risk model using the Risk 
Simulator software, taking into account interdependencies between the risk variables to emulate 
all potential combinations and permutations of outcomes. The analysis indicated that 
requirements volatility introduced an overall volatility of 0.0866% in the FCSN program. The 
volatility of 0.0866% resulted in a reduction in the NPV of the FCSN program from $6.4 trillion to 
$6.1 trillion. This reduction in NPV is a result of the potential increased costs in light of the risks 
facing the FCSN program, which ultimately reduces the value of the investment effort from a 
financial point of view. 
To improve the accuracy of the volatility estimates, we chose to refine the volatility using 
the DST. This is accomplished by establishing “belief functions” that reflect the “degrees of 
belief” between our NPV estimates in light of the risks posed by requirements uncertainty and 
the FCSN cost estimates provided by two independent sources: the Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group (CAIG) and the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA). The independent belief functions 
based on the CAIG and IDA, which inferred basic probability assignments associated with each 
of the FCSN risk factors (i.e., requirements, integration, estimation risk, etc) were combined 
using an orthogonal matrix to determine the most probable beliefs for the set of risk factors. 
Where the combined functions reflected “belief” in our estimates, the latter were considered 
valid and were left untouched.  When the combined belief functions reflected conflict with our 
estimates, our estimates were revised accordingly. We ran the Monte Carlo simulation of the 
model with the revised risk estimates again. Based on the risk of requirements uncertainty 
presented in the FCSN, a resulting “refined” volatility of 0.0947% was obtained. The derived 
volatility, which reflects an increase from the initial volatility estimate of 0.0866%, results in a 
further reduction of NPV of the FCSN program from $6.1 trillion to $5.7 trillion. Details of the 
computation can be found in Olagbemiro (2008). 
5.3 Options Development 
The FCS software effort has been decomposed into six components: Combat 
Identification, Battle Command and Mission Execution, Network Management System, Small 
Unmanned Ground Vehicle, Training Common Component, and Systems-of-Systems Common 
Operating Environment. We consider a hypothetical scenario in which we assume that of the six 
component systems, the Systems-of-Systems Common Operating Environment is not facing 
uncertainty while the other five software components are facing uncertainty. We proceeded and 
developed two options to address this scenario: (1) Compound Option and (2) Deferment 
Option. 
 
                                                
4 The requirements volatility of 12% was computed based on start and ending SLOC for the FCSN 
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Figure 5. FCS Strategy Tree Depicting Strategy A and B for Given Scenario 
 
(1) Strategy A—The Compound Option 
 
In the event that at least one of the software components is not facing requirements 
uncertainty, with all the others facing requirements uncertainty, an option could be developed to 
scale down the resources/staff allocated to the software components facing requirements 
uncertainty. The staff could then be switched to work on the software component that is not 
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facing requirements uncertainty, while the uncertainties in the other components are addressed 
using our uncertainty elicitation model.5 We, therefore, frame the real options in this case as an 
Option to Contract and Scale Down from an uncertain system, Option to Switch resources to 
another system, Optios to Expand and Scale Up staff assigned to the development of a system 
not facing uncertainty (shown as Strategy A in Figure 5).  Essentially, this is a compound 
option—an option whose “exercise” is contingent on the execution of the preceding option. 
(2) Strategy B—The Deferment Option 
  
In the event that five out of the six software components are facing requirements 
uncertainty, then an option could be developed to stop and defer all development to include the 
development of the software component that is not facing requirements uncertainty for a 
specified period until uncertainty is resolved (shown as Strategy B in Figure 5). This is an Option 
to Wait and Defer. 
5.4. Options Valuation 
We utilize the Real Options Super Lattice Solver (SLS) 3.0 software developed by Real 
Options Valuation, Inc., for the task.  
(1) Strategy A 
The Real Options SLS software was populated based on the following underlying values:  
(1) Development/Implementation cost of FCSN is $163.7 billion, 
(2) Value of underlying asset is $6.4 trillion, 
(3) The risk-free rate is 3.0%, 
(4) Volatility of the project is 0.0947, 
(5) Duration of software development is 13 years, and 
(6) Lattice steps was set to 300. 
The value of the underlying asset was computed as $6.4 trillion, and the option analysis 
of the value of the option under Strategy A returned a value of $6.27 trillion. 
(2) Strategy B 
In Strategy B, which calls for a “defer and wait approach,” an assumption is made that 
the duration for deferment option would be three years. We set up our model using the same 
assumptions used in strategy A, but we set the duration of the Deferment Option to three years. 
The value of the underlying asset was computed as $6.4 trillion, and the option analysis 
returned a value of $6.25 trillion. 
                                                
5 Note: The assumption with this approach is that the software component development effort, which the 
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5.5. Investment Valuation 
Given the option value of $6.27 trillion under Strategy A, the intrinsic value of the 
compound option is determined to be $6.4 trillion—$6.27 trillion = $130 billion. Under Strategy 
B, the intrinsic value of the deferment option is determined to be $6.4 trillion—$6.25 trillion = 
$150 billion. This implies that under both Strategies A and B, the software executive should be 
willing to pay no more than (and hopefully less than) the option premium of $130 billion and 
$150 billion, respectively, in addition to the initial investment cost of $163.7 billion to increase 
the chances of receiving the initially projected NPV of $6.4 trillion for the FCSN as opposed to 
the current $5.7 trillion in light of the risks caused by the uncertainties in five of the six software 
components. This premium would also include the administrative costs associated with 
exercising an option from an integrated logistics support point of view (i.e., costs associated with 
contractual agreements, software development retooling costs, and costs associated with 
infrastructure setup of the infrastructure). 
In analyzing both strategies, Strategy A is more attractive than Strategy B. Instead of 
waiting another three years at an additional potential cost of $150 billion (after which uncertainty 
would hopefully have been resolved) and then proceeding to spend $163.7 billion at once to 
develop all six software components, the staged-phase approach in Strategy A calls for 
spending up to $130 billion for the option up front plus some of the $163.7 billion for the 
Systems-of-Systems Common Operating Environment component, and then investing more 
over time as the requirements are firmed up for the other five components. Therefore, under 
these conditions, Strategy A—which employs the compound sequential options—is the optimal 
approach. 
6. Conclusion 
Uncertainties associated with software-related capital investments lead to unnecessary 
and sometimes preventable risks. As the DoD often sets optimistic requirements for weapons 
programs that require new and unproven technologies, the application of the real options 
valuation methodology would be beneficial to enable the DoD to incorporate the appropriate 
strategic options into the acquisition contracts. The options would serve as a contract 
between the software executive and the contractor––in the case of a government 
acquisition––to buy or sell a specific capability known as the options on the underlying 
project. The proposed real options valuation approach is able to overcome the limitations of 
traditional valuation techniques by utilizing the best features of traditional approaches and 
extending their capabilities under the auspices of managerial flexibility. The explicit uncertainty 
elicitation task, the development of options to hedge against the risk, and the timely execution of 
the options as they appear will allow decision-makers to better balance customer requirements 
as dictated by operational needs within financial viability and schedule constraints and manage 
risks proactively. 
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